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INTANGIBLE PRIVACY RIGHTS: HOW EUROPE’S GDPR 
WILL SET A NEW GLOBAL STANDARD FOR PERSONAL 
DATA PROTECTION 
Beata A. Safari* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (“EU” or the “Union”) prides itself on the 
extensive privacy protections it affords its citizens: protections that far 
outweigh those provided to American citizens.1  The European Union 
Charter on Fundamental Rights (“the Charter”), enacted in 2000, 
provides the basis for European recognition of the importance of 
protecting personal data.2  Under Article 8 of the Charter, “[e]veryone 
has the right to the protection of personal data3 concerning him or 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 
The George Washington University.  I am deeply thankful to Professor Tracy Kaye for 
introducing me to the Schrems Case, sparking my interest in this subject matter.  I thank 
my faculty advisor, Professor David Opderbeck, for providing me with the foundation 
I needed to understand Internet law.  I thank Professor Gaia Bernstein for opening 
my eyes to the world of information privacy and contributing to this Comment.  As 
always, I am eternally grateful for the support of my family and loved ones. 
 1  Instead of the omnibus approach of the European Union, the United States has 
a variety of statutes and regulatory agencies which cover aspects of privacy law.  These 
statutes include, but are not limited to, the following: The Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act of 1986 (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); Cybersecurity Information Act of 2015, 
6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1533 (2012); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 
(BSA), Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-2 (2012).  See Daniel Dimov, Differences between 
the Privacy Laws in the EU and the US, INFOSEC INST. (Jan. 10, 2013), http://resources. 
infosecinstitute.com/differences-privacy-laws-in-eu-and-us/. 
 2  See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Explanations Relating to the 
Complete Text of the Charter, EUR. UNION COUNCIL 26 (Dec. 2000), http://www.consilium 
.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29/Explanation%20relating%20to%20
the%20complete%20text%20of%20the%20charter.pdf. 
 3  “Personal data” is defined as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable legal person (‘data subject’).”  “Processing of personal data” is “any 
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not 
by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation 
or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or 
destruction.”  Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter 
Data Protection Directive]. 
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her,” particularly with regard to the fair processing of data “for 
specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.”4  Directive 
95/46/EC (“Data Protection Directive” or “the Directive”) influenced 
the freedom of protection of personal data, notably in its preamble 
where it acknowledges differences in the levels of protection with 
respect to the right to privacy and that “the processing of personal data 
afforded in the Member States may prevent the transmission of such 
data from the territory of one Member State to that of another 
Member State.”5  Most Americans could not fathom the importance 
privacy holds to Europeans: one popular theory describes this 
phenomenon as the difference between valuing liberty, for Americans, 
and dignity, for Europeans.6 
Data protection is so important to European citizens that the 
European Union requires foreign entities—particularly the United 
States, where most technology companies are headquartered—to 
adhere to its stringent requirements.7  The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor 
Framework (“Safe Harbor Framework” or “Safe Harbor”) was created 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce working with the European 
Commission (“the Commission”) as a means of implementing the 
“adequacy” framework adopted by the European Union’s Data 
Protection Directive.8  Under the adequacy framework, American 
 
 4  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8, 2000 O.J. (C 
364/1). 
 5  Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, at art. 7. 
 6  James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
YALE L.J. 1151, 1163 (2004) (“If I may use a cosmological metaphor: American privacy 
law is a body caught in the gravitational orbit of liberty values, while European law is 
caught in the orbit of dignity.  There are certainly times when the two bodies of law 
approach each other more or less nearly.  Yet they are consistently pulled in different 
directions, and the consequence is that these two legal orders really do meaningfully 
differ: Continental Europeans are consistently more drawn to problems touching on 
public dignity, while Americans are consistently more drawn to problems touching on 
the depredations of the state.  Indeed, as our many transatlantic conflicts suggest, the 
distances between us can often stretch into the unbridgeable.”). 
 7  Companies must adhere to requirements because the Data Protection Directive 
promises EU citizens protection of personal data, which cannot be achieved without 
the participation of the countries from whence the data originates. Safe Harbor 
Certification, PRIVACYTRUST (Feb. 2016), http://www.privacytrust.com/guidance/safe_ 
harbor.html.  A list of all participants in the Safe Harbor Framework can be found at 
U.S.-EU Safe Harbor List, U.S. DEP’T COM., https://safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2016) (a user types an identifier of the company in the search for 
“Organization Name,” which brings up the name of the organization as it was certified, 
how long it is U.S.-EU certified for, and the nature of its personal data). 
 8  Welcome to the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor, U.S. DEP’T COM. (Jan. 26, 2017, 12:38 PM), 
http://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018475.asp [hereinafter Safe Harbor 
Overview].  See Safe Harbor Certification, supra note 7. 
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organizations avoided interruptions or delays in their dealings with the 
Union due to EU member states (“Member States”) privacy laws.9  The 
program provided a number of benefits to participating American and 
European organizations, including: delivering “adequate” privacy 
protection; binding Member States by the European Commission’s 
finding of “adequacy”; bringing claims by EU citizens in the United 
States; and structuring compliance requirements to be cost-effective, 
with the benefit resting on small and medium businesses.10 
Although in 1995 the Data Protection Directive set an 
unprecedented foundation for personal data protection, in 2012, the 
European Union proposed a reform of data protection rules11 because 
protection has not remained current through the immense 
technological advances that have taken place since.  Furthermore, the 
nature of the legislation has prevented every EU Member State from 
implementing uniform standards across the board.12  Now, the new 
proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), if successful, 
will “make Europe fit for the digital age.”13 
This Comment argues that certain articles in the GDPR would 
impose greater requirements for data privacy, for example, the 
provisions on “profiling,” the right to data portability, and the “right 
to be forgotten.”  The directive proposed to accompany the GDPR in 
the areas of investigation and prosecution, among other police duties, 
in relation to criminal offenses and other judicial activities,14 is outside 
the scope of this Comment.  Additionally, the focus in this Comment 
is on “controllers” of personal data, not on “processors” of personal 
data.15  Part II explores the goals of the Data Protection Directive and 
 
 9  Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 8. 
 10  Safe Harbor Privacy Principles: Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce on July 21, 
2000, U.S. DEP’T COM. (Jan. 30, 2009, 3:03 PM), http://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/ 
eu/eg_main_018475.asp. 
 11  Protection of personal data, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2017). 
 12  Press Release, European Comm’n, Agreement on Commission’s EU data 
protection reform will boost Digital Single Market (Dec. 15. 2015), europa.eu/rapid/ 
press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission proposes a comprehensive 
reform of data protection rules to increase users’ control of their data and to cut costs 
for businesses (Jan. 25, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of data protection rules]. 
 15  A “controller” is “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any 
other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data.”  Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 27 April 2016, on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
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the Safe Harbor Framework, as well as some of their major criticisms, 
leading to the adoption of the new GDPR and the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield.  Part III breaks down strengths and weaknesses of the GDPR, 
introduces the cases which influenced change in the Union’s privacy 
regime, and analyzes how some key articles would affect foreign 
entities.  Part IV discusses how data privacy changes would affect the 
future affairs of a company such as LinkedIn through application of 
the provisions and analysis discussed in Part III.  Part V aggregates the 
analysis from Part IV and superimposes it upon anticipated new 
technological advances and the effectiveness of the GDPR in light of 
those advances.  Finally, Part VI, the conclusion, condenses the 
information in this Comment to predict the implications of the GDPR 
on a new global privacy standard. 
II. THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE: IMPLEMENTATION IN THE EU 
AND THE U.S. 
A. Goals of Data Protection Directive 
When the Data Protection Directive passed on October 24, 1995, 
it was approved in the context of two pieces of legislation: the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s 
“Recommendations of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing 
the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border Flows of Personal Data.”16  
Article 8 of the ECHR introduces the right to respect one’s private and 
family life, home, and correspondence, stating: 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the 
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of: national security; public safety or the economic wellbeing 
of the country; for the prevention of disorder or crime; for 
the protection of health or morals; or for the protection of 
 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 4(7), 2016 
O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR Provisions].  A “processor” is “a natural or legal 
person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf 
of the controller.”  Id. art. 4(8) (emphasis added).  For a list of the kinds of services that 
a controller could complete which a processor cannot, see Vanessa Barnett, Data 
controllers and data processors: what is the difference?, CHARLESRUSSELLSPEECHLYS (June 4, 
2014), https://www.charlesrussellspeechlys.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/tmt 
/2014/data-controllers-and-data-processors-what-is-the-difference/. 
 16  The OECD Guidelines have since been updated.  2013 OECD Privacy Guidelines, 
ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2013), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_ 
privacy_framework.pdf. 
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the rights and freedoms of others.17 
The goals for implementing the Directive were an amalgamation 
of the promotion of free-flowing data and the protection of 
fundamental human rights.  Under the preamble, the Directive was 
meant to encourage the easy flow of personal data from one Member 
State to another, while also preserving fundamental rights of 
individuals.18  The general facilitation of cross-border flows of personal 
data was a major factor.  The Commission also recognized that the 
processing of data carried out by a person in a third country should 
not interfere with the protection granted to European Union citizens.19  
In addition, the processing of personal data must be carried out with 
the consent of the individual, unless the personal data may be 
disclosed due to legitimate ordinary business activities of companies.20  
In the context of the advancement of human rights goals, the Directive 
sought to strengthen and promote peace and liberty and other 
fundamental freedoms as provided in the European Convention, 
primarily the right to privacy.21  Although not expressly provided for in 
the Directive, article 12(b) could be considered the first real primer 
on the “right to be forgotten.”22 
B. Safe Harbor Framework 
Until February 2016, the Safe Harbor Framework allowed 
American companies to enter the European marketplace through an 
assurance that the American companies were complying with the basic 
data requirements imposed by the Data Protection Directive.23  
Entering into the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework was an entirely 
voluntary decision and required adherence to only a few conditions.  
 
 17  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 18  Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, ¶¶ 8, 9 (“[I]n order to remove the 
obstacles to flows of personal data, the level of protection of the rights and freedoms 
of individuals with regard to the processing of such data must be equivalent in all 
Member States . . . . Member States will no longer be able to inhibit the free movement 
between them of personal data on grounds relating to protection of the rights and 
freedoms of individuals, and in particular the right to privacy . . . .”). 
 19  Id. ¶ 20 (“[T]he fact that the processing of data is carried out by a person 
established in a third country must not stand in the way of the protection of individuals 
provided for in this Directive . . . .”). 
 20  Id. ¶ 30 (“[T]he processing of personal data must in addition be carried out 
with the consent of the data subject or be necessary for the conclusion or performance 
of a contract binding on the data subject . . . .”). 
 21  Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, at pmbl. (1), (2). 
 22  Id. art. 12. 
 23  Although, arguably, the Safe Harbor Framework is not defunct until the EU-
U.S. Privacy Shield is fully in place.  Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 8. 
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To qualify for membership in the program, an organization could 
either join a self-regulatory privacy program that already adhered to 
the requirements, or it could develop its own self-regulatory privacy 
program in conformance with the framework.  Beyond that, 
compliance was monitored by adherence to the seven Safe Harbor 
Privacy Principles, which are: (1) notice; (2) choice; (3) onward 
transfer; (4) access; (5) security; (6) data integrity; and (7) 
enforcement.24 
The notice principle required organizations to notify data users 
about the purposes for which information was collected and used.25  
The choice principle required that data users be given the opportunity 
to opt out from disclosing personal information to a third party.26  For 
sensitive information, an explicit choice must have been given if the 
information would have been disclosed to a third party or used for a 
purpose other than originally intended.27  The onward transfer 
principle simply acknowledged that in order to disclose information to 
a third party, an organization must have complied with the notice and 
choice principles.28  The organization needed to ensure that the third 
party subscribed to the Safe Harbor Framework principles (or it 
needed to enter into a contractual agreement to confirm that it did 
so).29  The access principle required data users to have access to 
information about themselves that the company held, and to have the 
ability to correct, amend, or delete information.30  This access principle 
resembles the “right to be forgotten” principles, in that the General 
Data Protection Regulation, described in detail infra Part III.C., would 
ensure that users have the ability to control their level of engagement, 
as well as the extent of the personal data they share.  The security 
principle charged organizations to implement precautions in 
protecting personal information from loss, misuse and unauthorized 
access, disclosure, alteration, and destruction.31  The data integrity 
principle needed organizations to take sensible steps to ensure that 
data was reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and 
current.32  The enforcement principle required: (1) instantly available 
and affordable mechanisms so that each individual’s complaints and 
 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. 
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 8. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. 
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disputes could be investigated and resolved; (2) procedures to validate 
that commitments to Safe Harbor principles had been adhered to; and 
(3) commitments to solve problems arising out of failure to comply 
with the principles.33 
Some of the most prominent criticisms of the Safe Harbor 
Framework include: a failure to renew certification, lack of 
certification or receipt of certification twice, distribution of false and 
misleading information regarding certification under the Framework, 
and a difficulty in establishing enforcement mechanisms and following 
through with complaints.34  With regard to the lack of adequate 
compliance, only 348 out of 1109 registered organizations under the 
Safe Harbor complied with the most basic requirements of the 
Framework.35  The Safe Harbor had not worked properly in a long 
time, so when the European Union proposed the General Data 
Protection Regulation, it was clear that the United States would be 
directly affected.  Thus, negotiations between the United States 
Commerce Department and the European Commission commenced. 
 
 
 33  Id. 
 34  See CHRIS CONNOLLY, THE US SAFE HARBOR – FACT OR FICTION? 1, 4, 7 (2008), 
http://www.galexia.com/public/research/assets/safe_harbor_fact_or_fiction_2008/
safe_harbor_fact_or_fiction.pdf.  See, e.g., Comm’n of the European Communities, The 
application of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data 
provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and related Frequently Asked Questions issued 
by the US Department of Commerce 8 (Working Paper No. SEC(2002) 196),  
http://web.archive.org/web/20060724174359/http://www.ec.europa.eu/justice_ho
me/fsj/privacy/docs/adequacy/sec-2002-196/sec-2002-196_en.pdf (“A substantial 
number of organisations that have self-certified do not meet the requirement in FAQ 
6 [on self-certification] quoted above.  For some, no public statement of adherence to 
the Safe Harbour Principles could be found, apart from the self-certification itself.  For 
a small number, the privacy policy mentioned in the self-certification could not be 
accessed.”); Comm’n of the Communities, The implementation of Commission Decision 
520/2000/EC on the adequate protection of personal data provided by the Safe Harbour privacy 
Principles and related Frequently Asked Questions issued by the US Department of Commerce 7–
8 (Working Document No. SEC(2004) 1323) (“Regarding the enforcement Principle, 
which requires companies to identify either an Alternative Dispute Resolution body or 
the EU panel to hear individuals’ complaints, the Commission notes that a number of 
companies fail to do so.  When companies select the EU panel, almost all of them fail 
to state their commitment to comply with the advice of the EU panel as required by 
FAQ 9 [when HR data is transferred from Europe to a Safe Harbor organization], or 
to indicate how the EU panel can be contacted.  When companies select ADRs, they 
often fail to inform individuals of the arrangements for taking up complaints with the 
ADR.”). 
 35  See CONNOLLY, supra note 34, at 4. 
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C. American Involvement in the GDPR and EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 
Extensive American involvement in the drafting of the GDPR, 
discussed further infra Part II.D, and implementation of changes in the 
Safe Harbor Framework have culminated in the new EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield (“Privacy Shield”).36  In 2013, American companies and the 
American government lobbied at length to amend provisions 
requiring businesses to obtain explicit consent from consumers before 
collecting data, and to take out provisions that would allow consumers 
to remove all traces of personal data upon request.37  Since then, the 
United States remained actively engaged in negotiations for the 
enactment of a new safe harbor agreement in Brussels.38  In fact, 
American involvement has been so extensive that LobbyPlag, a website 
whose purpose consists of delivering greater transparency of ongoing 
deliberations in the European Commission about the GDPR by leaking 
documents,39 is merely one among about a dozen privacy groups that 
called on the U.S. government to cease its “unprecedented lobbying 
campaign.”40 
Aside from the imposition of American beliefs on European 
citizens, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology began a 
collaborative project with the University of Amsterdam called the EU-
U.S. Privacy Bridge Project (“Bridge Project”) in May 2014, whose aim 
is to “bridge the gap between the data privacy regimes in the United 
States and the European Union,” thus strengthening the framework of 
the Safe Harbor.41  The Bridge Project published its recommendations 
 
 36  Rob Price, Europe Narrowly Avoided a Major Disaster for American Businesses – For 
Now, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/privacy-
shield-european-regulators-article-29-working-party-full-text-2016-2?r=UK&IR=T. 
 37  Kevin Collier, U.S. Lobbyists Are Writing Europe’s Data Protection Rules, DAILY DOT 
(Feb. 11, 2013, 14:25 CT), http://www.dailydot.com/news/us-lobbyists-european-
data-privacy/.  The U.S. government struggled with the notion that personal data 
could be removed upon request of the individual affected: this is contrary to the 
drafting of American statutes, such as the CAN-SPAM Act, and to the philosophy of 
“opting out.”  See infra note 101. 
 38  Mark Scott, Data Transfer Pact Between U.S. and Europe Is Ruled Invalid, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1OhKvgl. 
 39  Governments, LOBBYPLAG (Jan. 16, 2016, 2:14 EST), http://www.lobbyplag.eu/ 
governments. 
 40  Collier, supra note 37 (“[T]here are 64 instances where proposed amendments 
to the Data Protection Regulation have text identical to passages from previously-
written lobbyist memos.”); Zack Whittaker, Privacy Groups Call on US Government to Stop 
Lobbying Against EU Data Law Changes, ZDNET (Feb. 4, 2013, 6:00 GMT), 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/privacy-groups-call-on-us-government-to-stop-
lobbying-against-eu-data-law-changes/. 
 41  Privacy Bridges Project Mission, MASS. INST. TECH., https://privacybridges.mit.edu 
/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2017).  See also Cynthia O’Donoghue & Katalina Bateman, EU-
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in September 2015, offering ten “bridges” to enhancing a “progressive, 
sustainable model for protecting privacy in the global Internet 
environment.”42  Although the Bridge Project is not a governmental 
initiative, it does have “soft support” from the European Commission 
and did have “soft support” from the Obama Administration,43 so it 
could be a step in the right direction if the EU and U.S. choose to 
adhere to the recommendations. 
D. The Doubtful Efficacy of the Privacy Shield 
On February 2, 2016, the European Union and United States 
confirmed that the European Commission and Department of 
Commerce had agreed upon the provisions of the Privacy Shield.44  
The United States Secretary of Commerce, Penny Pritzker, referred to 
the agreement as the “product of two years of productive discussions 
among [European and American] teams.”45  Laura E. Gardner, from 
the Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce—
speaking on her own behalf—stated that, “We are really confident that 
we addressed all of the concerns” from the court, EU Commission, and 
critics.46  She exuded excitement at the steady in-flow of self-
certifications from American companies; she claimed that nearly 300 
had been completed at the time.47  At the same time, Gardner 
 
US Privacy Bridge Project Announced, REEDSMITH (May 8, 2014), 
http://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2014/05/privacy-data-protection/eu-us-
privacy-bridge-project-announced/; Angela R. Matney et al., The Challenges of Third-
Party Data Privacy Protection, 61 RISK MGMT. 32, 34 (2014). 
 42  JEAN-FRANÇOIS ABRAMATIC ET AL., PRIVACY BRIDGES: EU AND US PRIVACY EXPERTS 
IN SEARCH OF TRANSATLANTIC PRIVACY SOLUTIONS (2015), http://privacybridges.mit. 
edu/sites/default/files/documents/PrivacyBridges-FINAL.pdf. 
 43  Matney et al., supra note 41, at 34. 
 44  Press Release, European Commission, EU Commission and United States agree 
on new framework for transatlantic data flows: EU-US Privacy Shield (Feb. 2, 2016), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-216_en.htm. 
 45  Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 
(Annex I) 1 (letter from U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker). 
 46  Laura E. Gardner, Senior Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Int’l 
Commerce, U.S. Dep’t Com., Address at the Seton Hall Law Review Symposium (Sept. 
30, 2016) [hereinafter Gardner Address]. 
 47  Id.  Since then, it appears that more than 500 companies have self-certified, 
which still falls far short of the over 4,400 companies certified under the Safe Harbor 
Framework.  Peter Loshin, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield certification process picks up steam, slowly, 
TECHTARGET (Oct. 21, 2016, 8:30 AM EST), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/ 
news/450401509 
/EU-US-Privacy-Shield-certification-process-picks-up-steam-slowly [hereinafter EU-U.S. 
Privacy Shield].  See, e.g., MobileIron Receives EU-US Privacy Shield Certification from US 
Department of Commerce, NEWSWIRE ASS’N LLC (Dec. 19, 2016, 2:00 PM EST), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/mobileiron-receives-eu-us-privacy-shield-
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acknowledged that the Privacy Shield complies with the Data 
Protection Directive, and not the GDPR; she asserted that the 
Commerce Department is aware of this and will adjust.48  Per this 
adjustment process, Gardner provided that this process offers an 
opportunity to cooperate with the European Union, so the Commerce 
Department will adapt and respond to changes in Europe and the 
United States: “We are going to keep working with Europe.”49 
The four major changes that the EU Commission and the United 
States claim will take effect as a result of the new framework are: (1) 
greater responsibilities on companies exchanging with European 
users; (2) a more capable enforcement structure; (3) clearer security 
measures and more transparency of American government access; and 
(4) competent and adequate protection of European citizens’ rights 
with multiple avenues for reparations.50  It is of note that the United 
States has agreed to deliver clear limitations and oversight mechanisms 
which would greatly diminish the U.S.’s ability to engage in 
surveillance.51  It has also agreed to refrain from indiscriminate mass 
surveillance.52  With regard to the last element, the Privacy Shield 
would institute formal deadlines for companies to reply to complaints, 
and alternative dispute resolution would be provided without a fee.53 
The United States has assured the European Commission that it 
will institute an annual joint review, discussing the companies’ 
adherence to the principles.54  The Privacy Shield aims to provide 
Europeans the opportunity for redress in the United States through 
the Judicial Redress Act of 2015, whose purpose is to “extend Privacy 
Act remedies to citizens of certified states,” with the European Union 
being one of those certified states under section 2(d)(1)(A)(i), as it 
“has entered into an agreement with the United States that provides 
for appropriate privacy protections for information.”55 
Reports about the new provisions have proved lukewarm, at best.  
 
certification-from-us-department-of-commerce-300380686.html; Ultimate Completes 
Certification for Cloud Security Standard ISO 27018, BUSINESSWIRE (Dec. 19, 2016), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20161219 
005684/en/Ultimate-Completes-Certification-Cloud-Security-Standard-ISO. 
 48  Gardner Address, supra note 46. 
 49  Id. 
 50  EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, supra note 47. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Judicial Redress Act of 2015 (H. R. 1428), Pub. L. No. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 
(2016). 
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Critics have expressed concern that the Privacy Shield will not become 
enforceable because it will not pass court scrutiny, European Member 
States will not agree to pass it, and the document has no teeth to it.56  
According to the Harvard Business Review, the Privacy Shield “will 
likely do nothing to add even a modicum of new protection to the 
personal information of European citizens.”57  The man who almost 
single-handedly brought about the demise of the Safe Harbor 
Framework, Maximilian Schrems (discussed infra Part III.D.ii), found 
the Privacy Shield lackluster: “There are tiny improvements, but the 
core rules on private data usage are miles away for EU law.  This is 
nowhere close to ‘essential equivalence’ that the Court required.”58  
Schrems even went so far as to say, “They put ten layers of lipstick on a 
pig but I doubt the [Court and Data Protection Authorities] suddenly 
want to cuddle with it.”59 
Confirming the predictions of many, in September 2016, a privacy 
group filed a challenge in the General Court of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ).60  There is very little known about the challenge so far, 
and according to the procedure of the ECJ, it would take more than a 
year for the matter to be heard.61  What is clear is that the privacy 
 
 56  See generally Caroline Craig, EU-US Privacy Shield Offers Flimsy Protection, 
INFOWORLD (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.infoworld.com/article/3029969/privacy/eu-
us-privacy-shield-offers-flimsy-protection.html; Larry Downes, The Business Implications 
of the EU-U.S. “Privacy Shield”, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/02/the-business-implications-of-the-eu-u-s-privacy-shield; 
Natasha Lomas, Draft Text of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Deal Fails To Impress The Man Who 
Slayed Safe Harbor, TECHCRUNCH DAILY (Feb. 29, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2016/ 
02/29/lipstick-on-a-pig/. 
 57  Downes, supra note 56. 
 58  Lomas, supra note 56. 
 59  David Gilbert, Safe Harbor 2.0: Max Schrems Calls ‘Privacy Shield’ National Security 
Loopholes ‘Lipstick On A Pig’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2016, 1:30 PM), http://www.ib 
times.com/safe-harbor-20-max-schrems-calls-privacy-shield-national-security-
loopholes-lipstick-2327277 (quoting @MaxSchrems, TWITTER (Feb. 29, 2016)). 
 60  Action brought on 16 September 2016 – Digital Rights v Commission (Case T-670/16), 
CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=185146& 
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=423368 (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Digital Rights v Commission] (reader should make 
sure that the “Language of document” is in “English”). 
 61  There is no mention in the ECJ Rules of Procedure how long the court could 
take to decide a case; yet, given that the privacy group concerned did not request an 
urgent preliminary ruling, the decision will likely not be expedited.  The President of 
the Court may, however, separately consider whether urgency is necessary.  Consolidated 
Version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012, EUR. CT. JUST. 
arts. 107–08 (2012), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/ 
2012-10/rp_en.pdf.  See also Reuters, This Privacy Group is Challenging the U.S.-EU Data 
Pact, FORTUNE.COM (Oct. 27, 2016, 8:59 AM EST), http://fortune.com/2016/10/27/ 
privacy-data-eu-us/. 
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group, Digital Rights Ireland, petitions the court to “declare that the 
[Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 
2016]62 is null and void” and to “order the annulment of the 
[Commission Implementing Decision] relating to the adequacy of the 
protection provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield.”63  Among the court’s 
challenges will be to determine whether the Privacy Shield is even of 
direct concern to the privacy group, a standing issue.64 
It remains to be seen what the legacy of the Privacy Shield will be.  
While it is too early to know how it will be treated in the courts, the 
Privacy Shield has been accepted by the European Commission65—
which means that Member States must adhere to the decision66—and 
the European Court of Justice will likely not come face-to-face with the 
agreement until late 2017 or early 2018.  Notwithstanding any 
challenges, it is law, so businesses will need to adapt, fast.  As the 
Department of Commerce is aware, the Privacy Shield needs 
modification to conform to the provisions of the GDPR, which will 
replace the Data Protection Directive in May 2018.67 
III. THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR) 
A. The Distinction Between Directives and Regulations 
There is an important distinction between EU directives and 
regulations, and that distinction is among the reasons why the 
European Commission strived to replace the Data Protection Directive 
by a regulation.  Directives are broad, goal-driven pieces of legislation 
which provide guidelines for Member State implementation, but 
depend on the independent passage of a law in every Member State 
 
 62  Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250, supra note 45, at art. 13 
(“The Commission has carefully analysed U.S. law and practice, including these official 
representations and commitments.  Based on the findings developed in recitals 136-
140, the Commission concludes that the United States ensures an adequate level of 
protection for personal data transferred under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield from the 
Union to self-certified organisations in the United States.”). 
 63  Digital Rights v Commission, supra note 60. 
 64  See This Privacy Group is Challenging the U.S.-EU Data Pact, supra note 61. 
 65  See generally Commission Implementing Decision, supra note 45. 
 66  For a description of how the European Commission works, see generally 
European Commission at Work, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/index_ 
en.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (for more information, click on “How decisions are 
made” and “Decision-making during weekly meetings”). 
 67  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 51(4) (“Each Member State shall notify 
to the Commission the provisions of its law which it adopts pursuant to this Chapter, 
by 25 May 2018 and, without delay, any subsequent amendment affecting them.”). 
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within a designated period of time.68  Regulations are narrow, specific 
pieces of legislation which become immediately enforceable—and 
binding—in every Member State without implementing a law in each 
State.69  When the European Commission first considered reforming 
data protection, it was not yet clear that a directive would be replaced 
by a regulation.70  The Commission committed to addressing the 
following issues: 
(1) Addressing the impact of new technologies; 
(2) Enhancing the internal market dimension of data 
protection; 
(3) Addressing globalisation and improving international 
data transfers; 
(4) Providing a stronger institutional arrangement for the 
effective enforcement of data protection rules; 
(5) Improving the coherence of the data protection legal 
framework.71 
The first challenge, addressing the impact of new technologies, 
focuses on the difficulty in ensuring free and informed consent, and 
securing sensitive data, thus assuring transparency for individuals on 
the Internet.72  The second challenge in enhancing the internal market 
dimension of data protection takes into account the limited remedies 
available to nationals for bringing complaints in front of their courts, 
ensuring legal certainty, and curtailing the administrative burden of 
the notification system.73  In responding to the third challenge—
improving international data transfers—the Commission likely only 
envisioned the passage of a new law in the European Union; that would 
not have been sufficient.  However, the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield 
supposedly has solved that challenge, as discussed supra Part II.C.  The 
fourth and fifth challenges refer to the issue discussed supra, in that 
the Directive is incapable of addressing the inconsistencies across the 
European Member States because currently each State imposes 
different regulatory schemes and provides greater protections than 
 
 68  See generally Regulations, Directives and other Acts, EUR. UNION (Dec. 16, 2016), 
http://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en. 
 69  Id. 
 70  See generally Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A 
Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, at 7, COM 
(2010) 609 final (Nov. 4, 2010) [hereinafter A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data 
Protection]. 
 71  Id. at 3–4. 
 72  Id. at 6, 8–9. 
 73  Id. at 10–13. 
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others in some areas, as well as fewer in others.74 
The text of the new articles in the GDPR grants users, inter alia, 
new rights and creates the European Data Protection Board.  Article 7 
provides conditions for consent;75 article 15 creates a right of access for 
the data subject;76 article 16 produces a right to rectification;77 article 
17 forms the bread and butter of the right to be forgotten and to 
erasure;78 article 20 informs the right to data portability;79 article 21 
discusses the right to object to the processing of one’s personal data 
for direct marketing;80 article 22 explains profiling and the new 
measures put into effect;81 article 68 sets up the European Data 
Protection Board;82 and article 70 describes the tasks of the newly-
formed Board.83 
 
 74  Id. at 17–18. 
 75  If a data subject—“an identified or identifiable natural person”—needs to give 
consent, the requirement must be clear.  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at arts. 4(1), 
7.  A subject has the right to withdraw consent at any time.  Id. art. 7(3). 
 76  The article provides data subject’s right of access to personal data, 
supplementing the need to inform data subjects of a storage period and of rights to 
rectification and to erasure and to lodge a complaint.  Id. art. 15. 
 77  “The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without 
undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her.  
Taking into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the 
right to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a 
supplementary statement.”  Id. art. 16. 
 78  “Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged 
pursuant to [of article 17(1)] to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account 
of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, 
including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal 
data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, 
or copy or replication of, those personal data.”  Id. art. 17(2). 
 79  “The data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning 
him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly 
used and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to 
another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the personal data 
have been provided, where: (a) the processing is based on consent . . . or on a 
contract . . . ; and (b) the processing is carried out by automated means.”  Id. art. 20(1). 
 80  Id. art. 21. 
 81  A data user has the right not to be subject to a measure producing a quasi-
discriminatory effect, “based solely on automated processing, including profiling, 
which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects 
him or her.”  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, art. 22(1).  The article goes on to list 
exceptions to the subjection of the measure.  Id. art. 22(2). 
 82  “The European Data Protection Board . . . is hereby established as a body of the 
Union and shall have legal personality.”  Id. art. 68. 
 83  The Board hereby has duties to advise the Commission; examine Members; 
review the application of the guidelines; make recommendations and best practices; 
issue opinions; promote cooperation; promote common training programs; and 
promote exchange of knowledge.  Id. art. 70. 
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B. Alignment with Europe 2020 Strategy 
Europe 2020 was a strategy proposed by the European 
Commission on March 3, 2010, to advance the EU’s economy.84  
Specifically, the Commission sought to create “smart, sustainable, 
inclusive growth”85 and increased coordination of national and 
European policy.  The Commission proposed five measurable targets 
to complete by the year 2020, which are: (1) employment; (2) research 
and innovation; (3) climate change and energy; (4) education; and (5) 
combating poverty.86  The Commission proposed a priority theme 
called “a digital agenda for Europe,” under which Member States 
would “speed up the roll-out of high-speed internet and reap the 
benefits of a digital single market for households and firms.”87 
Under “A Digital Agenda for Europe,” the proposal lists elements 
that the Commission will work on—at the EU level—to produce 
sustainable economic and social benefits from what it calls a “Digital 
Single Market.”88  One of the elements has the following broad-based 
aim: 
To create a true single market for online content and services 
(i.e. borderless and safe EU web services and digital content 
markets, with high levels of trust and confidence, a balanced 
regulatory framework with clear rights regimes, the fostering of 
multi-territorial licences, adequate protection and remuneration 
for rights holders and active support for the digitisation of 
Europe’s rich cultural heritage, and to shape the global 
governance of the internet . . . .89 
In the Communication on Digital Agenda for Europe, the 
European Commission stresses the need to create a “vibrant digital 
single market,”90 because the detachment of policies among the 
 
 84  Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM (2010) 2020 
(Mar. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Europe 2020].  For a brief and pictorial explanation of 
ordinary legislative procedure in the European Parliament, see Legislative Powers: 
Ordinary legislative procedure, EUR. UNION (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.europarl.europa. 
eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00004/Legislative-powers. 
 85  Europe 2020, supra note 84, at 3.  Smart growth is “developing an economy based 
on knowledge and innovation”; sustainable growth is “promoting a more resource 
efficient, greener, and more competitive economy;” inclusive growth is “fostering a 
high-employment economy delivering social and territorial cohesion.”  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 4. 
 88  Id. at 11–12.  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A 
Digital Agenda for Europe, COM (2010) 245 final/2 (Aug. 26, 2010) [hereinafter A 
Digital Agenda for Europe]. 
 89  Europe 2020, supra note 84, at 12 (emphasis added). 
 90  A Digital Agenda for Europe, supra note 88, at 7. 
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Member States stifles competitiveness in the digital economy 
worldwide.  The Commission must recognize that some of the most 
successful Internet businesses are based out of the United States; as a 
result, there is inconsistent implementation of rules across Member 
States.  This inconsistency calls for transparency in defining the scope 
of data users’ rights and legal protection when doing business online. 
A regulation, as opposed to the current Directive, would be a huge 
step towards increasing coordination of national and European policy.  
This way, certain Member States that might otherwise not be 
predisposed to a safer security framework would need to work harder 
to achieve the standards that other Member States have worked more 
intensively to attain because of the initial Directive.  A regulation would 
place all Member States on equal footing, as opposed to the drastic 
variations the Member States have upheld thus far, leading to a 
disjunctive result.  If the European Union intends to impose stricter 
guidelines on foreign companies, it certainly must be a model for its 
new policies worldwide.  On December 15, 2015, negotiations between 
the EU Commission, Parliament, and Council concluded, resulting in 
the GDPR.91 
C. Strengths and Weaknesses in the GDPR92 
Before the text of the GDPR became public information in 
December 2015, LobbyPlag released a current version of the GDPR 
proposal, so users could scroll through the document and see what text 
the Commission proposed and the Council removed, what sections the 
Council inserted, and the commentary from LobbyPlag as to what 
would likely be a stronger or weaker law than its predecessor.93  In this 
subsection, the focus will be on identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses in the GDPR, but limited to the scope of the articles of 
interest, specifically articles 6, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22, 25, and 83. 
1. Article 83 – Administrative Fines 
Businesses would certainly agree that the most disquieting change 
to the GDPR is article 83, which provides conditions for imposing 
 
 91  Reform of EU data protection rules, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/just 
ice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2017). 
 92  Strengths and weaknesses are evaluated based on the enforceability of the 
separate provisions. 
 93  Regulation Proposal, LOBBYPLAG (Jan. 15, 2016, 15:12), http://www.lobbyplag 
.eu/governments/gdpr [hereinafter Regulation Proposal].  The official text of the 
GDPR can be found at supra note 15. 
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administrative fines.94  Given the difference between directives and 
regulations, the Directive did not have the power to institute a “one 
size fits all” regimen for liability; the European Commission handed 
that discretion off to the Member States and their supervisory 
authorities.95  The GDPR continues the tradition of the supervisory 
authorities under article 51, but for the first time provides two 
definitive levels of administrative fines under article 83.96  Now, fines 
could range from  10,000,000 and two percent of the company’s total 
annual turnover, or anywhere from  20,000,000 to four percent of the 
company’s annual turnover, whichever is higher in either case.97  To 
put these numbers into perspective, consider Google’s revenue, which 
was $74.5 billion in 2015.98  A range from two percent of its turnover to 
four percent would be from $1.49 billion ( 1.43 billion) to $2.98 
billion (  2.85 billion).  Money talks: the new enforcement mechanism 
certainly discourages indifference and encourages compliance. 
2. Article 7 – Conditions for Consent 
When a data subject provides explicit consent under article 
9(2)(a), article 7(2) requires that consent be given as a written 
declaration that is “clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in 
an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain 
language.”99  Consent may be withdrawn at any time, but any 
 
 94  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 83. 
 95  Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, at art. 23 (“Member States shall provide 
that any person who has suffered damage as a result of an unlawful processing 
operation or of any act incompatible with the national provisions adopted pursuant to 
this Directive is entitled to receive compensation from the controller for the damage 
suffered.”); id. art. 24 (“The Member States shall adopt suitable measures to ensure 
the full implementation of the provisions of this Directive and shall in particular lay 
down the sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement of the provisions adopted 
pursuant to this Directive.”). 
 96  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 51(1) (“The Member States shall adopt 
suitable measures to ensure the full implementation of the provisions of this Directive 
and shall in particular lay down the sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement 
of the provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive.”); id. art. 83. 
 97  Id. arts. 83(4), 83(5).  For a concise breakdown of the levels of administrative 
fines and infringement of which articles would affect which level, see Nuria Pastor & 
Georgina Lawrence, Getting to know the GDPR, Part 10 – Enforcement under the GDPR –
what happens if you get it wrong?, FIELD FISHER (Mar. 5, 2016, 15:19), http://privacylaw 
blog.fieldfisher.com/2016/getting-to-know-the-gdpr-part-10-enforcement-under-the-
gdpr-what-happens-if-you-get-it-wrong/. 
 98  Google, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2015), at 23, https://www. 
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000165204416000012/goog10-k2015.htm 
(“Google segment revenues of $74.5 billion with revenue growth of 14% and Other 
Bets revenues of $0.4 billion.”). 
 99  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 7(2). 
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processing of information based on the consent already granted could 
be lawfully processed; before giving consent, the data subject would be 
made aware of these circumstances and the controller has a duty to 
inform about the right to withdraw consent.100  These two subsections 
evidence a substantially strict rule for consent through terms or privacy 
policies, one that is not akin to what American companies are used to, 
with their opt-out mechanisms.101 
3. Articles 9 & 16 – Processing of Special Categories of 
Personal Data, and Right to Rectification 
Article 9 shapes the processing of special categories of personal 
data.  Personal data, particularly that revealing race or ethnicity, 
political affiliation, religion or beliefs, or genetic, health or sex life, is 
prohibited.102  A significant change from the Directive is that personal 
data now includes genetic and biometric data.103  A substantial strength 
of the article also consists in its limitation of third-country transfers of 
“health data,” because it requires that data be managed by a medical 
professional who is answerable to a duty of professional secrecy, 
whether it is through a third State or a national body.104  Article 16 
delineates the right to rectification, which provides a data subject with 
 
 100  Id. art. 7(3) (“The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of 
processing based on consent before its withdrawal.  Prior to giving consent, the data 
subject shall be informed thereof.  It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent.”). 
 101  Compare CAN-SPAM Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 316, § 316.5 (2012) (“Prohibition on 
charging a fee or imposing other requirements on recipients who wish to opt out.”), 
with Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 
2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications), art. 13(3), 2002 O.J. (L 201) (“Member States shall take appropriate 
measures to ensure that, free of charge, unsolicited communications for purposes of 
direct marketing, in cases other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, are not 
allowed either without the consent of the subscribers concerned or in respect of 
subscribers who do not wish to receive these communications, the choice between 
these options to be determined by national legislation.”). 
 102  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 2(a) (“Processing of personal data 
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the 
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data 
concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”). 
 103  Id.  But see Data Protection Directive, supra note 3 (“‘[P]ersonal data’ shall mean 
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific 
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”). 
 104  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 9(3) (“Personal data . . . may be 
processed . . . by another person also subject to an obligation of secrecy under Union 
or Member State law or rules established by national competent bodies.”). 
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the right to rectify any inaccuracies in personal data that concerns him; 
an attractive feature of the right is that the requesting data subject has 
the right to receive it “without undue delay.”105  A data subject may also 
request the completion of incomplete personal data.106 
4. Articles 6 & 21 – Lawfulness of Processing, and Right to 
Object 
The right to object is located under article 21.  The GDPR allows 
a data subject to protest the processing of data for any of the reasons 
under article 6(1)(e) or 6(1)(f)—these provisions govern processing 
carried out in the public interest or processing necessary for the 
legitimate purposes of the controller or a third party—unless that right 
is overridden by the “controller demonstrat[ing] compelling 
legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, 
rights and freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, 
exercise or defence of legal claims.”107  The data subject could also 
object to his personal data being processed for direct marketing 
purposes—including profiling to the extent it relates to said 
marketing—and it does not appear that the controller has an 
opportunity to rebut the request.108  From the drafting of the provision, 
it appears that the right to object applies when data is still in the 
processing stage, and is not yet collected, or better yet, stored.  While 
it might be a worthwhile endeavor to offer a right to object, it is 
perplexing to identify what kind of personal data could qualify as being 
processed for a public interest or is necessary for the legitimate 
purposes of the controller or a third party.109 
5. Article 22 – Automated Individual Decision-Making, 
Including Profiling 
The right not to be subject to “automated individual decisions-
making,” better understood as profiling, is under article 22.110  Besides 
 
 105  Id. art. 16 (“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller 
without undue delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or 
her.”). 
 106  Id. (“[T]he data subject shall have the right to have incomplete personal data 
completed . . . .”). 
 107  Id. art. 21(1). 
 108  Id. art. 21(2)–(3). 
 109  It must be that a legitimate purpose would include processing for a “legitimate 
business purpose” of the controller, such as payment.  Yet, if the personal data 
concerns the subject who requested it not be processed in the first place, wouldn’t that 
legitimate purpose no longer be valid? 
 110  See supra note 81. 
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the right to be forgotten and the right to object, this right will also have 
a substantial effect on a company like LinkedIn.111  The only situations 
in which the right would not apply are when the automated decision is 
essential in carrying out a contract between the subject and controller, 
the decision is authorized by a law to which the controller is held, or 
the decision is made possible by the subject’s explicit consent.112  In 
general, this right is to the benefit of the data subject since it prohibits 
the unreasonable invasion into an individual’s personal preferences 
and characteristics; however, a data subject might be caught in a 
dilemma if it is found his consent was conditional under article 7 upon 
“the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service.”113 
The draft first written by the Commission for article 7(1) stated 
that the controller would bear the burden of proof for the data 
subject’s consent.114  The Council’s revision now stands as requiring the 
controller to “be able to demonstrate that the data subject has 
consented to processing of his or her personal data” in the context of 
article 6(1)(a).115  The Council removed the last provision under article 
7, which nullified the legality of any consent provided by the data 
subject in the case of a noteworthy imbalance in bargaining power 
between the two parties.116  In essence, any ambiguity in the delivery of 
consent would be resolved in favor of the controller.  In addition, there 
is no consideration of the imbalance between parties—likely because 
there would often be a vast differential between the two parties—unless 
the data subject is a large business. 
6. Article 11 – Processing Which does not Require 
Identification 
Article 11 concerns circumstances in which processing the data 
does not, or does no longer, require personal information.  In such a 
case, the controller does not need to receive further information or 
 
 111  The extent of the right not to be subject to profiling and its practical application 
is discussed infra notes 200–03 and accompanying text. 
 112  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 22(2)(a)–(c). 
 113  Id. art. 7(4). 
 114  Regulation Proposal, supra note 93, at art. 7(1).  See supra note 15 for the 
definition of a “controller.” 
 115  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 7(1).  Article 6(1)(a) states that 
“[p]rocessing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following 
applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal 
data for one or more specific purposes . . . .” 
 116  See Regulation Proposal, supra note 93, at art. 7(4) (“Consent shall not provide a 
legal basis for the processing, where there is a significant imbalance between the 
position of the data subject and the controller.”). 
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engage in more processing.117  This is a strength since the provision 
does not require controllers to maintain or process more information 
than necessary simply to be able to comply with the GDPR;118 this way, 
it takes the burden off the controller as soon as the controller no 
longer possesses personal data, for whatever reason. 
7. Article 17 – Right to Erasure (“Right to be Forgotten”) 
The right to erasure, also known as the right to be forgotten, is 
embodied in article 17.119  The description of the right is as follows: 
“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the 
erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay 
and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data 
where one of the following grounds applies . . . .”120  The right may be 
exercised when the data is no longer necessary for its initial purpose,121 
the data subject withdraws his consent under article 6(1) or article 
9(2),122 the subject objects to the processing of personal data under 
article 21(1),123 the data has been unlawfully processed,124 the data must 
be erased in order to comply with certain legal obligations,125 or the 
data has been collected in reference to information services under 
article 8(1) (which this Comment does not cover).126 
8. Articles 20 & 25 – Rights to Data Portability & Privacy by 
Design 
Besides the right to be forgotten, discussed infra Part III.D, the 
rights to data portability and privacy by design are likely to have an 
extensive impact on a global expectation of privacy.  These rights can 
be thought of as original in the sense that they sound very attractive to 
data subjects aching to maintain greater control over their personal 
information.  On the flip side, they could prove to be immensely 
expensive to companies that are not capable of handling hundreds of 
 
 117  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 11(1) (“If the purposes for which a 
controller processes personal data do not or do no longer require the identification 
of a data subject by the controller, the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, 
acquire or process additional information in order to identify the data subject for the 
sole purpose of complying with this Regulation.”). 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. art. 17. 
 120  Id. art. 17(1).  See supra note 15, for the definition of “controller.” 
 121  Id. art. 17(1)(a). 
 122  Id. art. 17(1)(b). 
 123  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 17(1)(c). 
 124  Id. art. 17(1)(d). 
 125  Id. art. 17(1)(e). 
 126  Id. art. 17(1)(f). 
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requests daily to receive, remove, or reorganize personal data. 
The right to data portability is encapsulated under article 20 and 
offers data subjects the right to require data to be provided in a 
commonly-used electronic form.127  Read into the context of article 
15—right of access by the data subject—the right to data portability 
and the right of access to let a data subject acquire a full copy of 
personal data concerning him or her, and: (a) the purposes for the 
processing; (b) the categories of personal data involved; (c) recipients 
or categories thereof to whom the personal data has been disclosed or 
will be disclosed; (d) the period of time for which the personal data 
will be stored; (e) the right to request rectification or erasure of 
personal data; (f) the right to file a complaint with a supervisory 
authority; (g) if personal data is not collected from the data subject, 
available information as to where it could be found; and (h) whether 
automated decision-making exists.128  One of the few limitations to the 
rights of portability and access is that the right to obtain a copy of 
personal data being processed may not “adversely affect the rights and 
freedoms of others,” nor could the right to data portability as a whole 
adversely affect the rights of others.129  In reality, the likelihood that the 
request for a data subject’s personal data could affect the rights of 
others is potentially very low: unless the nature of the data about the 
requesting subject is inextricably linked to another individual who 
would take issue with its release, likely the controller would need to 
comply with the data subject’s request for data portability and access. 
Under the Europe 2020 proposal, what lies critical to the social 
benefits of the “Digital Single Market” are the fundamental rights of 
every individual user which must be enforced using the widest range 
of means: application of the principle of “privacy by design”130 and 
exercise of inhibitive sanctions when necessary.  Colloquially termed 
“privacy by design,” under article 25, this right is called “data 
protection by design and by default” and is the idea that privacy and 
data protection are, in some way, embedded within the entire life cycle 
of hard- and soft-ware, from early design, to use, to disposal.131  
 
 127  Id. art. 20(1)(a)–(b) (“The data subject shall have the right to receive the 
personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in 
a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to 
transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to 
which the personal data have been provided, where (a) the processing is based on 
consent . . . and (b) the processing is carried out by automated means.”). 
 128  Id. art. 15(1)(a)–(h). 
 129  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at arts. 15(4), 20(4). 
 130  A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection, supra note 70, at 12. 
 131  See generally Charith Perera et al., Privacy-by-Design Framework for Assessing Internet 
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Essentially, a controller would ensure that it is limiting the amount of 
data it uses to only a minimum amount of personal data; that way, “by 
default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific 
purpose of the processing are processed.”132  The only problem with 
privacy by design is: how could it be enforced?  There are too many 
variables a regulatory authority would consider before slapping a 
company with a fine claiming it did not comply with article 25.133  It 
appears that privacy by design is merely a utopian declaration that 
from this point forward, all companies should adhere to the ideal of 
minimizing the amount of personal data that is required by nature of 
their information processing. 
These sanctions seem evocative of the procedures the European 
Court of Justice discusses in Google Spain, infra Part III.D., proposed 
with regard to the “right to be forgotten.”  “Privacy by design” suggests 
an early acknowledgment that it is within an individual’s fundamental 
rights to be able to securely dispose of his data and that it is the 
responsibility of the company which processes data to ensure its 
infrastructure is designed with privacy in mind.134 
D. Evolution of the Right to be Forgotten 
Although the right to be forgotten was not included in the Data 
Protection Directive, the idea was almost implicit in the document 
under article 12.135  Even though the GDPR conflates the two terms 
under article 17, which is titled “Right to erasure (‘right to be 
forgotten’),” there are debates as to whether the right to be forgotten 
and the right to erasure represent the same idea.  According to one 
author, the right to erasure and the right to be forgotten are 
interchangeable terms.136  Another author argues that the two do not 
 
of Things Applications and Platforms, CORNELL UNIV. LIBR. 4 (2016), https://arxiv.org/ 
pdf/1609.04060.pdf. 
 132  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 25(2). 
 133  Id. art. 25(1) (“Taking into account the state of the art, the cost of 
implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as 
the risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms of natural persons 
posed by the processing . . . .”). 
 134  A ready list of which companies have embraced the philosophy is not yet 
available, and might never be.  Therein lies one of the difficulties in applying this 
framework: it would be near impossible to quantify who did or did not adopt the 
scheme. 
 135  See Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of data protection rules, 
supra note 14. 
 136  Cooper Mitchell-Rekrut, Note, Search Engine Liability Under the Libe Data 
Regulation Proposal: Interpreting Third Party Responsibilities as Informed by Google Spain, 45 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 861, Abstract (2014) (“The ‘right to be forgotten’—now branded as 
the ‘right to erasure’—has been publicized as one of the ‘four pillars’ of the EU’s 
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represent the same idea, as the right to be forgotten includes data “that 
does not breach any norm.”137  Such a norm could be any general 
provision of the Directive or Regulation.  The right to erasure “allows 
data subjects to request the elimination of their personal data when its 
retention or processing violates the terms of the directive, in particular 
(but not exclusively) because of being incomplete or inaccurate.”138  
On the other hand, enforcing the right to be forgotten would cause 
deletion of personal information regardless of whether the 
information proved harmful or was illegally processed.139 
1. Google Spain Case 
The first time the European Court of Justice (ECJ) heard a case 
involving the right to be forgotten was in Google Spain SL v. Gonzalez.140  
Mario Costeja Gonzalez, a Spanish national, filed a complaint with the 
Spanish Data Protection Agency against La Vanguardia Ediciones SL—
the publisher of a daily newspaper—and against Google Spain and 
Google, Inc.141  Gonzalez claimed that when any user entered 
Gonzalez’s name into a Google search engine, the results would link 
to two pages of La Vanguardia’s newspaper, January 1998 and March 
1998, respectively.142  Those pages did not speak well of Gonzalez 
because they announced a real estate auction effected for the recovery 
of social security debts owed by Gonzalez.143  First, Gonzalez requested 
that La Vanguardia either remove or alter the pages—so that the 
material would no longer be widely available—or use search engines 
to protect the data; second, Gonzalez requested that Google Spain or 
Google, Inc. remove or suppress the data so that it no longer linked to 
La Vanguardia.144  Gonzalez supported his assertions by referencing the 
fact that the attachment proceedings had been resolved and thus that 
retaining the data was irrelevant.145 
The court held that by searching for information published on 
the Internet, the data user “collects” data within the meaning of the 
 
proposed General Data Protection Regulation.”). 
 137  Ignacio Cofone, Google v. Spain: A Right To Be Forgotten?, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 1, 8 (2015). 
 138  Id. at 6. 
 139  Id. at 8. 
 140  See Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Case 
C-131/12, [2014] E.C.R. I-317, EU:C:2014:317. 
 141  Id. ¶¶ 2, 14. 
 142  Id. ¶ 14. 
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. ¶ 15. 
 145  Id. 
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Directive.146  The data user is the “controller” in respect of the 
processing of the search engine.147  The operator of the search engine 
is—in certain circumstances—responsible for removing links to web 
pages that are published by third parties which contain information 
relating to a person from the list of results displayed.148  Such an 
obligation may also exist when the name or information is not erased 
from those pages and even when initial publication was lawful. 
A fair balance should be struck between the interest of potential 
future users in the data sought and the data subject’s fundamental 
rights.  Courts must consider: (1) the nature of the information; (2) 
the sensitivity for the data subject’s private life; and (3) the interest of 
the public in having that information.149 
The ECJ recognized a right to be forgotten under the Data 
Protection Directive.150  The court found that a citizen may require a 
provider like Google to remove his or her name from searches if the 
personal data has become inadequate, irrelevant, and excessive in 
relation to the purpose for which it was originally processed due to the 
lapse of time.151 
2. Schrems Case 
The second pivotal case the ECJ heard implicating—though never 
directly referring to—the right to be forgotten was in 2015, in 
Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner.152  Maximilian 
Schrems filed a class-action-type civil suit in Ireland against the Data 
Protection Commission, alleging that Facebook Ireland violated data 
use policy, did not provide effective consent to many types of data use, 
supported the NSA’s PRISM surveillance program,153 tracked Internet 
 
 146  Google Spain SL, [2014] E.C.R. I-317, ¶ 28. 
 147  Id. ¶ 21. 
 148  Id. ¶ 62. 
 149  Id. ¶ 81. 
 150  Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, at art. 12. 
 151  Patrick Van Eecke & Jim Halpert, The ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Today’s Information 
Age, 32 WESTLAW J. 1, 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/ 
Insights/Publications/2014/12/The_right_to_be_forgotten_in_todays_info_age.pdf. 
 152  Maximilian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Case C-362/14, 
EU:C:2015:650. 
 153  The PRISM surveillance program—the existence of which was leaked by 
Edward Snowden—is an American surveillance program that was started in 2007 
whose purpose is to monitor the communications of users on nine popular Internet 
services: Microsoft, Apple, Google, Facebook, Skype, AOL, PalTalk, Yahoo, and 
YouTube.  It was tacitly confirmed by the Obama Administration, but technology 
companies have denied their participation.  Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know 
About PRISM to Date, WASH. POST (June 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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users on external websites, monitored and analyzed users through “big 
data” systems, unlawfully introduced “graph search,” and passed user 
data to external applications without authorization of the data user.154  
Procedurally, the following occurred: the Safe Harbor was sent to the 
European Court of Justice;155 and the case was tried in 2015 in the 
European Court of Justice, but the opinion by Advocate General Bot 
was delayed,156 likely because of talks behind closed doors between the 
US and the EU.  Following the postponement, the plaintiff applied to 
have the case considered in the first instance in the Vienna Regional 
Court (Landesgericht), but the court found that a “class action” is not 
admissible on procedural grounds.157  The case was appealed to the 
Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht).158  The 
Oberlandesgericht was to decide whether class actions are lawful; as 
the matter stands, the case has been referred to the European Court 
of Justice, once more.159  The reason the case was referred so quickly to 
the ECJ in the first place was because, as Mr. Schrems called it, the 
courts were “playing hot potato,” either being unwilling to answer the 
difficult questions posed, or simply at wits’ end.160  If nothing else, Mr. 
Schrems joked that he would like to be the litigant who had appeared 
most often in front of the ECJ.161 
On September 24, 2015, Advocate General Yves Bot released his 
opinion, in which he ruled that: the Safe Harbor was invalid; the Irish 
Data Planning Commissioner could not rely on the Safe Harbor; 
American companies which have active “safe harbor” certification 
would need to find another basis to transfer data from the US to the 
EU, such as “Binding Corporate Rules” included in the data protection 
directive; and Facebook did not participate in mass surveillance in the 
United States, nor was EU data made available to American 
authorities.162 
 
news/wonk/wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date/. 
 154  Class Action Against Facebook Ireland, EUR. VERSUS FACEBOOK (Dec. 1, 2015), 
http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/Complaints/Class_Action/class_action.html. 
 155  News, EUR. VERSUS FACEBOOK (Mar. 25, 2015), http://europe-v-facebook.org/E 
N/en.html. 
 156  Id. (June 9, 2015). 
 157  Id. (Oct. 21, 2015). 
 158  Id. (Nov. 23, 2015). 
 159  Id. (Sept. 12, 2016).  It stands to reason that what the European Court of Justice 
decides pertaining to class actions could be a separate topic ripe for discussion. 
 160  Maximilian Schrems, Initiator of Europe v. Facebook, Address at the CUNY 
Graduate Center: The US v. Europe v. Facebook: Digital Divisions? (Feb. 22, 2016) 
[hereinafter Schrems Lecture]. 
 161  Id. 
 162  See CJEU: First Reaction to AG’s Opinion on NSA “PRISM” Scandal Facebook’s EU-US 
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On October 6, 2015, the CJEU found that: transfers of personal 
data between third countries should not be given lower levels of 
protection than transfers within the European Union;163 Decision 
2000/520164—which implemented the safe harbor privacy principles—
does not contain sufficient guarantees;165 and finally that Facebook did 
not breach the safe harbor principles,166 but that its interference with 
the fundamental rights of EU citizens was contrary to provisions of the 
Charter because it did not pursue an “objective of general interest 
defined with sufficient precision.”167  In late October 2015, the Higher 
Regional Court issued a decision in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that 
the plaintiff is not a “professional litigant,” so he is entitled to bring his 
claims in his home court, but the status of the class action remains in 
dispute so the regional court referred it to the Austrian Supreme 
Court.168 
There are some practical difficulties in implementing the findings 
of this decision.  The right to be forgotten allows an individual to 
control his personal data if it is no longer necessary for its original 
purpose, or if for some other reason, he wishes to withdraw consent as 
to its processing, among other reasons.169  As a result, there would be 
higher protection for individuals and the right could ensure a more 
effective regulatory scheme.  In reality, however, is it possible to ask a 
company to delete information that was posted by an individual, in 
light of the fact that it might have been widely distributed already?  
When Mr. Schrems engaged in his “war” against Facebook, he 
requested all of the documents that the company possessed about him: 
what he received was a log of every single bit of information that even 
mentioned his name, whether it was still on the website or supposedly 
deleted a long time ago, in a huge stack of papers.170  This occurrence 
symbolizes the fact that although the GDPR might convince companies 
to remove information from their websites that consumers request be 
 
Data Transfers Under “Safe Harbor” Not Legal, EUR. VERSUS FACEBOOK (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/GA_en.pdf. 
 163  Maximilian Schrems, EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 144. 
 164  See Commission Decision 2000/520, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 (EC). 
 165  Maximilian Schrems, EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 159. 
 166  Id. ¶ 168. 
 167  Id. ¶ 181. 
 168  Media Update for 21/10/2015, EUR. VERSUS FACEBOOK (Oct. 21, 2015), 
http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/PA_OLG_en.pdf. 
 169  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 17.  See Guide to the General Data Protection 
Regulation, BIRD & BIRD 31 (Jan. 2017), https://www.twobirds.com/~/media/pdfs/gd 
pr-pdfs/bird—bird—guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation.pdf?la=en. 
 170  Schrems Lecture, supra note 160. 
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taken down, it might never truly disappear.171  In the struggle to 
immortalize the privacy right and render it tangible, privacy advocates 
have taken a picture of this stack of papers to the extent that Schrems 
joked about it and said, “It’s probably the most filmed stack of papers, 
ever!”172  This massive interest in Schrems’ stack of papers is the 
European and American attempt at rendering palpable this elusive 
privacy right.  In reality, it is unclear what actual privacy the right to be 
forgotten provides. 
IV. LINKEDIN AND HOW IT WILL BE AFFECTED 
A. The Unique Nature of LinkedIn 
LinkedIn was officially launched on May 5, 2003.173  The 
company’s mission is to “connect the world’s professionals to make 
them more productive and successful.”174  From its mission statement, 
LinkedIn expects to be able to extend its social network to people and 
businesses worldwide, which would certainly include Europe and the 
European Union Members. 
LinkedIn is unique from other popular social networks because 
its primary mission is to connect professionals around the world.175  
From the onset, the nature of its enterprise indicates that it is likely the 
company’s users would benefit from engaging in more secure 
practices: this view is a result of the perception that reputation is 
fundamental to any individual using the site.  Unlike other social 
networks, certain entities—namely employers—seek a certain category 
of individuals—employees—and vice versa.  Employees and employers 
 
 171  Although outside of the scope of this Comment, “processors” which processed 
personal data on behalf of the controllers, could still maintain copies of that removed 
data, as there appears to be little to no regulation of the activities of processors in the 
GDPR. 
 172  Id. 
 173  About Us, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/about-us?trk=uno-reg-guest-
home-about (last visited Mar. 23, 2016). 
 174  Id. 
 175  The most popular social networks that resemble LinkedIn include Facebook, 
Twitter, Google Plus+, and VK.  Facebook’s mission statement is “to give people the 
power to share and make the world more open and connected.” About, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page_info (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).  
Twitter’s mission is “[t]o give everyone the power to create and share ideas and 
information instantly, without barriers.”  About, TWITTER, 
https://about.twitter.com/company?lang=en (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).  Google+ is 
“a place to connect with friends and family, and explore all of your interests.”  About, 
GOOGLE+, https://plus.google.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).  “VK is a social network 
that unites people all over the world and helps them communicate comfortably and 
promptly.”  About VK, VK, http://www.vk.com/about (last visited Mar. 23, 2016). 
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would likely not seek out like categories of individuals, unless the 
intention was to engage in a forum. 
B. Current Policies in Place 
Through its exclusive applications, LinkedIn engages in 
marketing and sales to optimize business solutions to employers.  
LinkedIn collects information from the devices and networks used to 
access the site.  It has access to: (1) cookies;176 (2) IP addresses;177 (3) 
URLs from whence users arrived at the page; (4) URLs to which the 
users go; (5) OS details;178 (6) types of Internet browsers; (7) mobile 
IDs; and (8) location data.179  Taking into account the rather large 
amount of personal identifying information to which the company has 
access, it is necessary to taper its effects with some safeguards for users.  
As a result, LinkedIn allows individual users a great deal of control over 
the content they post on the site.  Under its “User Agreement,”180 
 
 176  There is an entire Cookie Policy dedicated to describing detailed information 
about how the website uses cookies. Cookies on the LinkedIn site, LINKEDIN, 
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/cookie-policy?trk=hb_ft_cookie (last visited Mar. 23, 
2016). 
 177  An IP address is a number which uniquely identifies a computer and any other 
electronic device on a computer network protocol, called TCP/IP.  Bradley Mitchell, 
What is an IP Address?, LIFEWIRE (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-an-
ip-address-818393. 
 178  OS stands for “operating system,” which is a program that controls and manages 
the hardware and software on a computer. Tim Fisher, Definition of an Operating System, 
LIFEWIRE (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.lifewire.com/operating-systems-2652912.  
 179  Privacy Policy, LINKEDIN § 1.10, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-
policy?trk=hb_ft_priv (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 180  The Rights and Limits to the “User Agreement” provide as follows: 
As between you and LinkedIn, you own the content and information that you 
submit or post to the Services and you are only granting LinkedIn the 
following non-exclusive license: A worldwide, transferable and 
sublicensable right to use, copy, modify, distribute, publish, and process, 
information and content that you provide through our Services, without 
any further consent, notice and/or compensation to you or others. 
These rights are limited in the following ways: 
a. You can end this license for specific content by deleting such 
content from the Services, or generally by closing your account, 
except (a) to the extent you shared it with others as part of 
the Service and they copied or stored it and (b) for the 
reasonable time it takes to remove from backup and other 
systems. 
b. We will not include your content in advertisements for the 
products and services of others (including sponsored 
content) to others without your separate consent. However, we 
have the right, without compensation to you or others, to 
serve ads near your content and information, and your 
comments on sponsored content may be visible as noted in 
the Privacy Policy. 
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LinkedIn provides a user’s “Rights and Limits” to include: (1) the 
ability to end LinkedIn’s broad license to the user’s content by deleting 
his content from the website or closing his account; (2) the 
requirement of user’s consent before information is used in ads for 
products and services of others; (3) the requirement of user’s consent 
before others may publish posts; and (4) the right not to have 
LinkedIn modify “the meaning of [the user’s] expression.”  LinkedIn 
has already included in its User Agreement a rather liberal policy with 
a few safeguards to user’s privacy and freedom to take down certain 
kinds of information. 
C. Which Provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
Would Apply 
Under article 23 of the Preamble, the GDPR aims to cover 
activities of outside controllers when such outside controllers’ 
processing activities are related to the offering of goods or services, or 
to the monitoring of the behavior of such data subjects.181  The 
question is whether LinkedIn provides goods or services.  Neither term 
is defined under article 4,182 nor under the Data Protection Directive.  
A definition of the terms might be presumed from the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), a quasi-constitutional 
document.183  Under the Treaty of Lisbon—which in 2009 amended 
 
c. We will get your consent if we want to give others the right to publish 
your posts beyond the Service. However, other Members and/or 
Visitors may access and share your content and information, 
consistent with your settings and degree of connection with 
them. 
d. While we may edit and make formatting changes to your 
content (such as translating it, modifying the size, layout or 
file type or removing metadata), we will not modify the meaning 
of your expression. 
e. Because you own your content and information and we only 
have non-exclusive rights to it, you may choose to make it 
available to others, including under the terms of a Creative 
Commons license. 
User Agreement, LINKEDIN § 3.1, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-
agreement?trk=hb_ft_userag (last visited Dec. 21, 2016) (emphasis added). 
 181  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at pbl. (23) (“In order to ensure that natural 
persons are not deprived of the protection to which they are entitled under this 
Regulation, the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by 
a controller or a processor not established in the Union should be subject to this 
Regulation where the processing activities are related to offering goods or services to such data 
subjects irrespective of whether connected to a payment.”) (emphasis added). 
 182  The definitions in the article are limited to various aspects of data and some 
definitions of a business nature, among other independent terms. 
 183  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
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the TFEU and the Treaty of Rome—Title II, article 28, “goods” include 
“products originating in Member States and . . . products coming from 
third countries which are in free circulation in Member States.”184  
“Free circulation” implies that: (1) import formalities have been 
conformed to; (2) customs duties or charges have been levied; and (3) 
the provider did not endure a total or partial drawback of the duties 
or charges.185  On the converse, “services” include: (a) activities of an 
industrial character; (b) activities of a commercial character; (c) 
activities of craftsmen; and (d) activities of the professions.186 
Under the definitions of goods and services in the TFEU, it would 
likely not be true that LinkedIn satisfies the requirement of offering 
any goods to parties in the European Union; it would, however, fall 
under the offering of services.  Under TFEU article 57(b)—activities 
of a commercial nature—and article 57(d)—activities of the 
professions—there is likely a strong argument that LinkedIn engages 
in activities of a commercial nature, since it engages in marketing, 
sales, and in activities of the professions.187  LinkedIn offers the 
following marketing products: “Lead Accelerator,” “Sponsored 
Updates,” “Sponsored InMail,” “Display Ads,” and “Text Ads.”188  These 
marketing campaigns allow companies to employ various approaches 
to ensuring that target audiences—whether they are sales teams or 
prospective employees—are contacted in a way that best suits their 
needs and is especially likely to get their attention.  LinkedIn offers 
companies the option of “social selling,” through its application called 
“LinkedIn Sales Navigator.”189  Through the navigator, companies are 
driven to make the right connections and sell their goals and 
aspirations to people whom they would personally affect.190 
 
 184  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, art. 28, 2007 O.J. C 306 [hereinafter Treaty of 
Lisbon]. 
 185  TFEU, supra note 183, at art. 29. 
 186  Id. art. 57. 
 187  There has been little case law regarding the definition of “activities of the 
professions.”  Most case law has focused on defining whether the term refers to a type 
of service, and has always been found to do so.  See Hubbard, Case C-20/92, [1993] 
E.C.R. I-3777.  Examples of “professions” have included individuals in the health 
profession, legal profession, and other regulated professions.  See, e.g., Khatzithanasis, 
Case C-151/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-9013; Commission v. Italy, Case 168/85, [1986] E.C.R. 
I-2945. 
 188  Market to who matters, LINKEDIN, https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-solu 
tions (last visited Mar. 4, 2017). 
 189  Sales Navigator, LINKEDIN, https://business.linkedin.com/biz/sales-solutions/ 
b2b-sales-navigator (last visited Mar. 23, 2016). 
 190  Id. 
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There is an especially strong argument that LinkedIn would satisfy 
the services definition under its activities of the professions, since it 
provides a gateway for employees and employers to reach out across 
the platform and benefit from interacting with each other.  Even if 
LinkedIn was to be free from the goods and services analysis, it would 
certainly fall under the realm of monitoring the behavior of its data 
subjects.  It is already clear through the brief description of the sales 
and marketing in which LinkedIn engages that it would likely qualify 
as applying a “profile” to an individual.  Again, the GDPR describes 
that the act of profiling targets decisions concerning the data subject 
for analyzing or predicting his personal preferences, behaviors, and 
attitudes.191 
D. Which Aspects of Business Would Change 
LinkedIn announced its Fourth Quarter results on February 4, 
2016.192  In a news release, the CEO, Jeff Weiner, exalted, “Q4 was a 
strong quarter for LinkedIn . . . .  We enter 2016 with increased focus 
on core initiatives that will drive leverage across our portfolio of 
products.”193  LinkedIn’s revenue increased by thirty-five percent in 
2015 from $862 million to $2.991 billion.194  LinkedIn started off 2016 
in a good place; the question is: would the Privacy Shield now cost the 
company dearly?  LinkedIn doesn’t think so; in October 2016, 
LinkedIn released the following in response to user inquiries on its 
Help page: 
LinkedIn is in the process of evaluating the Privacy Shield 
and its benefits for our members and customers.  In the 
meantime, we continue to rely on Standard Contractual 
Clauses as a legal mechanism for data transfers from the 
EU. . . .  Notably, these Standard Contractual Clauses, 
adopted by the EU Commission have not been invalidated by 
the ECJ decision. . . .  [T]hese clauses are contractual 
commitments between companies transferring personal 
data . . . binding them to protect the privacy and security of 
the data. . . . .  We remain committed to ensuring that our 
members continue to be able to use our services to advance 
 
 191  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 4(4). 
 192  LinkedIn Corporation Trended Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets, LINKEDIN 
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://snap.licdn.com/microsites/content/dam/press/Download-
Assets/Media%20Resources/Quarterly-Reports/Q4-2015-Consolidated-Metrics.pdf.  
 193  LinkedIn Corporate Communications Team, LinkedIn Announces Fourth Quarter 
and Full Year 2015 Results, LINKEDIN (Feb. 4, 2016), https://press.linkedin.com/site-
resources/news-releases/2016/linkedin-announces-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2015-
results. 
 194  Id. 
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their careers and pursue professional opportunities 
worldwide.195 
The company intends to rely on the Standard Contractual 
Clauses, which were provided by the European Commission in 2010 in 
compliance with the Data Protection Directive.196  The European 
Commission drafted these clauses as models for what businesses could 
include in their protection regimes with the knowledge that these 
clauses have already been deemed to provide adequate protection.197  
The retreat to the Standard Contractual Clauses is explained by 
reference to the publications of numerous law firms, which have 
advised their client companies that the clauses would be a means to 
legitimize international transfers of data.198  However, it stands to 
reason if these clauses are not grandfathered into the GDPR, they 
would be reexamined in the future, as well.199 
Assuming LinkedIn will need to find an alternative to the clauses, 
the company would no longer be capable of engaging in the extent of 
the profiling in which it currently engages; this “data minimization” 
would likely apply to every social network.  The company would likely 
need to modify its Rights and Limits under the User Agreement.  As it 
currently stands, it would not comply with the “right to be forgotten” 
 
 195  EU Data Transfers and the Safe Harbor, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/help 
/linkedin/answer/62533/eu-data-transfers-and-the-safe-harbor?lang=en (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2017). 
 196  Commission Decision on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of 
personal data to processors established in third countries under Directive 95/46/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2010 O.J. (L 39) 5. 
 197  Id. art. 1. 
 198  See, e.g., Will EU Standard Contractual Clauses be declared invalid as well?, 
LINKLATERS, http://linklaters.de/aktuelles/themen/after-safe-harbor-will-eu-stand 
ard-contractual-clauses-be-invalid.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2016); Lothar Determann 
et al., The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Versus Other EU Data Transfer Compliance Options, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sep. 12, 2016), https://www.bna.com/euus-privacy-shield-
n57982076824/; Privacy Shield is final: What it means for businesses, DLA PIPER (July 21, 
2016), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2016/07/privacy-
shield-is-final/; Richard Dickinson et al., EU-US Privacy Shield Adopted: Where Do We Go 
From Here?, ARNOLD & PORTER (July 18, 2016), http://www.arnoldporter.com/en/pers 
pectives/publications/2016/07/eu-us-privacy-shield-adopted-where; Top Ten – EU 
Data Transfers: Comparing the Proposed Privacy Shield to the Standard Contractual Clauses, 
ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL (May 24, 2016), http://www.acc.com/legalresources/public 
ations/topten/transferring-personal-data.cfm. 
 199  Accord Will EU Standard Contractual Clauses be declared invalid as well?, supra note 
198.  For now, the Article 29 Working Party has confirmed that the Clauses are still 
valid.  Cameron F. Kerry et al., Article 29 Working Party Confirms that EU Standard 
Contractual Clauses and Binding Corporate Rules are Still Valid – for the Time-Being, SIDLEY 
AUSTIN (Feb. 3, 2016), http://datamatters.sidley.com/article-29-working-party-confir 
ms-that-eu-standard-contractual-clauses-and-binding-corporate-rules-are-still-valid-for-
the-time-being/. 
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as it has been provided for in the GDPR and its likely future 
interpretation as a result of the case law.  The agreement does, 
however, provide ample consent provisions.  These provisions would 
likely need to be made more apparent to the future users.  LinkedIn 
would likely need to implement a divulgence policy regarding their 
users’ right of access to their personal data.  Users would need to be 
informed of how long their information would be stored, their right to 
rectify any incomplete or false information about them, their right to 
request an erasure of any information pertaining to them, and their 
right to lodge a complaint if the request is not complied with. 
However, LinkedIn might not need to disclose any more 
information than it already has about its profiling if it falls under one 
of the exceptions in the GDPR article 22(2)(a)–(c).200  Subsection (a) 
of this article considers whether entering into a contract immediately 
initiates the processing, and if the subject’s rights have been 
maintained through the disclosure of information; if so, then the 
profiling has been authorized.201  Subsection (b) considers whether the 
processing was authorized by a Member State and lays down 
procedures by which the subject’s interests are protected.202  
Subsection (c) considers whether the data subject gave consent under 
article 7 (Conditions for consent).203 
In the same vein, given the extent of the influence that LinkedIn 
exerts and its consistent growth, it is very likely that the 
implementation of the Privacy Shield and the GDPR will have a 
negligible effect on LinkedIn’s ability to do business.  LinkedIn has 
built-in mechanisms that can address changes in regulations, 
underscored by its news release that references changing regulations 
and the constant need to adapt to existing technology.  Since its 
inception in 2003, LinkedIn has experienced little to no technologies 
that have so rigorously threatened LinkedIn’s business model as to put 
it out of business.  In thirteen years, LinkedIn has built a sustainable 
model, which will certainly adapt to changing rules and regulations.  
The same, however, cannot be said for companies that want to make 
their first step into the European market: with these new rigorous 
 
 200  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 22(2)(a)–(c) (“Paragraph 1 shall not 
apply if the decision [including profiling]: (a) is necessary for entering into, or 
performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller; (b) is 
authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject . . .; or (c) 
is based on the data subject’s explicit consent.”).  See also supra note 110 and 
accompanying text. 
 201  See id. art. 22(2)(a). 
 202  See id. art. 22(2)(b). 
 203  See id. art. 22(2)(c). 
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requirements—enforceable or not—new businesses might find 
themselves dissuaded from the European market until they make 
enough revenue to instill greater data protection.  On the other hand, 
new companies might want to take their chances with provisions such 
as privacy by design, which do not have any teeth to them. 
V. NEW ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE GDPR 
A. Google Glass Version 2 
Google Glass was a headset designed by Google meant to be worn 
like a pair of eyeglasses, with “a small prism-like screen tucked into the 
upper corner of the frame” that allowed its user to remain engaged 
with his electronics, such as a phone or e-mail account.204  The purpose 
behind the technology was to allow a user to disengage with electronics 
by never needing to look down at a screen.205  According to one author, 
the original Google Glass failed because there was no real product 
launch, no mainstream advertising campaign, no proper explanation 
about its noteworthy features, and no easy way to purchase the 
product.206  Google made a second attempt, made public on December 
28, 2015, through a few FCC filings detailing the next version of 
Google Glass.207  Google expected that the second time, the product 
would be successful because it was no longer aimed at the general 
public, but rather meant to be used in the business marketplace.208  
Google Glass, though, was not meant to be; still, the end of Google 
Glass is not the end of smartglasses.209  These new developments would 
 
 204  Hayley Tsukayama, Everything You Need to Know About Google Glass, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 27, 2014, 12:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp 
/2014/02/27/everything-you-need-to-know-about-google-glass/. 
 205  Id. 
 206  Siimon Reynolds, Why Google Glass Failed: A Marketing Lesson, FORBES (Feb. 5, 
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/siimonreynolds/2015/02/05/why-google-glass-
failed/#55600c412131. 
 207  A few photos of the new device could be seen at: OET Exhibits List, U.S. FED. 
COMM. COMMISSION (June 12, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/eas/reports/View 
ExhibitReport.cfm?mode=Exhibits&RequestTimeout=500&calledFromFrame=N&ap
plication_id=eDyH1HI%2FRcK9NnzZ4ggP6w%3D%3D&fcc_id=A4R-GG1. 
 208  Jon Phillips, Google Glass Version 2: New Photos in FCC Filing, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Dec. 28, 2015, 2:05 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/3018501/wearab 
les/google-glass-version-2-new-photos-in-fcc-filing.html. 
 209  Hugh Langley, The patented history and future of. . .Google Glass: Quite the spectacle, 
WAREABLE (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.wareable.com/google/the-patented-history-
and-future-of-google-glass-656 (“As we said at the start of this piece, the past hints to 
the future, and we’d bet our bottom dollar that some of these ideas are still being 
worked on somewhere in Alphabet land.  We still haven’t seen many of the patented 
concepts appear in the flesh, including some of the more advanced gesture controls 
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bear further legal complications; if, for example, smartglasses were to 
enter the corporate market, employers could require employees to use 
the technology for much of the day.  To what extent would the 
employers be capable of monitoring employees through accessing 
their smartglasses? 
B. Car-to-Car Communication 
Some cars on the road today already have the capability to brake 
in case their drivers do not foresee an impending collision.  Examples 
of such top-of-the-line cars include the PRE-SAFE® system on select 
Mercedes-Benz models, Toyota’s pre-collision safety, and Lexus’ pre-
collision system with pedestrian detection on select SUV models.210  
The state of technology currently consists of using radar or ultrasound 
to detect obstacles or vehicles; but cars could only use this technology 
to the extent that they could detect the nearest obstruction.211  
Developing technology leads cars into a realm in which they are 
capable of broadcasting their location, speed, steering-wheel position, 
brake status, and a variety of other data points to cars in a couple of 
hundred meters from their location.212  Despite the fact that companies 
like AT&T, with its Connected Car, and General Motors, with its car-
to-car communication in a 2017-model Cadillac, are pioneering 
immense changes in the landscape of vehicle safety, it might take 
longer than a decade for talking cars to prove a reality, and especially 
for that market to expand to Europe.213 
C. Network of Millions of Genomes 
Most people have at least heard of the Human Genome Project, a 
scientific endeavor initiated in 1990 with the intended goal of mapping 
the human genome.214  The project, started by the National Center for 
 
and minimal designs.”). 
 210  Safety, MERCEDES-BENZ (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.mbusa.com/mercedes 
/benz/safety#module-1; Toyota Safety Sense, TOYOTA (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.toy 
ota-global.com/safety-sense/; Safety, LEXUS (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.lexus.com/ 
models/RX/safety. 
 211  Will Knight, Car-to-Car Communication: A Simple Wireless Technology Promises to 
Make Driving Much Safer, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.technologyrev 
iew.com/s/534981/car-to-car-communication/. 
 212  Id. 
 213  Id.; see also Connected Car, AT&T, https://www.att.com/shop/wireless/connect 
ed-car.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016); News and Stories, GENERAL MOTORS, 
http://www.gm.com/all-news-stories.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
 214  An Overview of the Human Genome Project, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., 
https://www.genome.gov/12011239/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). 
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Human Genome Research, combined with the United States 
Department of Energy to become the International Human Genome 
Project.215  The legacy that the project created when it was complete in 
April 2003 is being capitalized on every year, from the project 
ENCODE to the promotion of a Genomic Data Sharing Policy.216  The 
most recent and riveting research project is entitled the Matchmaker 
Exchange.  Matchmaker Exchange was founded in 2013 with the goal 
of building a network on the 200,000 genomes that have already been 
mapped (Exchange) of phenotypic and genotypic profiles, and then 
linking those profiles (Matchmaker) to similar cases in order to find 
genetic causes for patients with rare diseases.217  Doctors cannot 
diagnose patients with rare diseases because they are not definitively 
confident about what causes the genetic variances to occur.218  The 
beauty of the enterprise is all that is needed to equip researchers with 
the causative gene is a single additional case with the same deleterious 
variant: finding one other person with that same variant solves the 
puzzle.219 
D. Long-Term Effect of the GDPR on Emerging Technologies 
These technological advances point to the fact that it would be 
difficult to maintain a few of the rights encapsulated in the GDPR, 
particularly the right to be forgotten.  With regard to the Matchmaker 
Exchange, the GDPR properly dispensed with the following concern: 
if a European with a rare disease was given the option to remove files 
indicating her genetic variance and she was the only person 
documented with that variance, she would deprive any other 
individuals with that variance from ever having the ability to determine 
what rare disease they possess; her privacy concerns would overtake the 
ability to provide another affected individual proper medical care.  
Article 89, however, did not provide for such an exception.220  Apropos 
 
 215  About the Institute, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/ 
10001763/about-nhgri-a-brief-history-and-timeline/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
 216  See generally About NHGRI: A Brief History and Timeline, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. 
INST., http://www.genome.gov/10001763#2003 (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
 217  The Solution, MATCHMAKER EXCHANGE, http://www.matchmakerexchange.org/ 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2016).  See Antonio Regalado, Internet of DNA: A Global Network of 
Millions of Genomes Could be Medicine’s Next Great Advance, MIT TECH. REV. (2015), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/535016/internet-of-dna/. 
 218  Id. 
 219  The Challenge, MATCHMAKER EXCHANGE, http://www.matchmakerexchange.org 
/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2016). 
 220  GDPR Provisions, supra note 15, at art. 89 (“Processing for archiving purposes 
in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, 
shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the 
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connected cars, attempting to retrieve information from the vehicles 
would likely constitute a breach of privacy, concerning which a data 
subject would be given permission to remove data.  An additional 
difficulty would be that of the hypothesized embedded chips in human 
bodies: retrieving information from the chips would indisputably 
entail a breach of the most sacred privacy. 
One author analyzed the right to privacy and control over one’s 
data, and concluded that although too little privacy endangers 
democracy, the same could be said if constituents have too much 
privacy.221  Evgeny Morozov devised a theory of the “invisible barbed 
wire,” in which he postulates: “The invisible barbed wire of big data 
limits our lives to a space that might look quiet and enticing enough 
but is not of our own choosing and that we cannot rebuild or 
expand.”222  As for what more personal data on the Internet leads to, 
he concluded that, “[t]he more information we reveal about ourselves, 
the denser but more invisible this barbed wire becomes.”223  Quoting 
Spiros Simitis, Germany’s leading privacy scholar and practitioner, 
Morozov disagreed with the libertarian approach espoused by Simitis, 
and stated the following very aptly: 
[N]o progress can be achieved, he said, as long as privacy 
protection is “more or less equated with an individual’s right 
to decide when and which data are to be accessible.”  The 
trap that many well-meaning privacy advocates fall into is 
thinking that if only they could provide the individual with 
more control over his or her data—through stronger laws or 
a robust property regime—then the invisible barbed wire 
would become visible and fray.  It won’t—not if that data is 
eventually returned to the very institutions that are erecting 
the wire around us.224 
Morozov’s reasoning sheds light on the fact that the opportunity 
to control one’s data may not only be a fallacy, but it would likely only 
tighten the noose around data users. 
 
 
 
rights and freedoms of the data subject.  Those safeguards shall ensure that technical 
and organisational measures are in place in particular in order to ensure respect for 
the principle of data minimisation.”) 
 221  Evgeny Morozov, The Real Privacy Problem, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 22, 2013), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/520426/the-real-privacy-problem/. 
 222  Id. 
 223  Id. 
 224  Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: A NEW GLOBAL STANDARD 
The General Data Protection Regulation comes into full effect in 
May 2018; until then, the Privacy Shield will need to endure at least 
one challenge in the General Court in the European Court of Justice 
and adapt its provisions to conform to the GDPR, not the Directive.  
Most American companies will continue to resort to use of the 
Standard Contractual Clauses, until such future point that the 
European Commission deems them no longer in compliance with the 
GDPR.  It appears that the rights to data portability, to access, to data 
minimization, and to be forgotten will dramatically increase data users’ 
capacity to control what personal data will be available to others—and 
what data they could acquire themselves—after it has been published 
on the Internet.  The fact that virtually any personal data would 
become vulnerable—even data that is not particularly harmful or was 
not illegally published in the first place—supports the proposition that 
there will be an influx of individuals who will request erasure of their 
personal information immediately upon the application of the GDPR 
in 2018.  As a means of preventing this constant debacle among 
websites and individuals, it is likely that companies will institute more 
stringent privacy requirements and will make them easily detectable 
on their websites. 
As it stands, the stance of the new presidential administration is 
uncertain.  President Donald Trump has commented on certain 
surveillance issues, but has not taken an official stance on 
technology.225  Ted Dean, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Services at the 
Department of Commerce, commented, “Bear in mind the history of 
the Safe Harbor program, which was negotiated under the Clinton 
administration, implemented under the Bush administration and 
continued under the Obama administration.  This is the type of 
program that carries on across administrations.”226  Though 
precedence is by no means the only condition for a good policy, the 
Privacy Shield—as the successor to the Safe Harbor—would likely 
withstand the inauguration of new leadership in the United States.  
That being said, the Privacy Shield’s peaceful transition into a new 
administration on its own does not ensure the continuing viability of 
 
 225  Nicky Stewart, The Trump effect, ITPROPORTAL (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.it 
proportal.com/features/the-trump-effect/; Stuart Lauchlan, Privacy Shield – under fire 
from activists with Donald Trump yet to show his hand, DIGINOMICA, LTD. (Dec. 20, 2016), 
http://diginomica.com/2016/12/20/privacy-shield-fire-activists-donald-trump-yet-
show-hand/. 
 226  David Meyer, The Trump effect on Privacy Shield: ‘There’s a great deal that’s unknown’, 
INT’L ASS’N PRIVACY PROFS. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/the-trump-
effect-on-privacy-shield-theres-a-great-deal-thats-unknown/. 
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the program. 
For current technology moguls, such as Google, Facebook, 
LinkedIn, Yahoo, and others, it appears that just as they have been 
flexible with responding to changing technologies in the past, so they 
will be flexible with responding to the Privacy Shield and GDPR.  What 
is most worrisome is the ability of new companies to adapt to this 
changing climate, and the actuality with which the right to be 
forgotten, right to data portability, and especially, privacy by design, 
will significantly affect these emerging companies’ business models.  
The right to be forgotten might essentially disappear from the actual 
application of the GDPR with the widespread use of some newer 
technologies because they would prove to substantially undermine the 
entire purpose of these inventions; this might occur either through 
amendment of the GDPR or through practice. 
There is no doubt that a huge shift in the understanding of the 
protection of private information will occur over the next year within 
the European Union and with its relationship with the United States.  
This shift could also bring great privacy improvements for American 
residents as well, because if companies must adhere to heightened 
requirements so that they could conduct business in the Union, they 
might as well implement those safeguards for their employees and 
American customers, too.  Likewise, as the United States previously set 
the guideposts for Internet usage with its advent, it will do it again 
through compliance with the Privacy Shield and, implicitly, with the 
General Data Protection Regulation; except this time, American 
companies are being motivated by the European Union. 
 
